This paper discusses aspects of a framework for modeling labor supply where the notion of job choice is fundamental. In this framework, workers are assumed to have preferences over latent job opportunities belonging to worker-specific choice sets from which they choose their preferred job. The observed hours of work and wage is interpreted as the job-specific hours and wage of the chosen job. The main contribution of this paper is an analysis of the identification problem of this framework under various conditions, when conventional cross-section micro-data are applied.
Introduction
In the traditional approach to labor supply modelling, individual behavior is viewed as a choice among feasible leisure and disposable income combinations. This approach has been criticized for ignoring important behavioral aspects, namely that individuals in the labor market typically have preferences over job types and may face restrictions on their choices regarding job opportunities and hours of work. Recently, the discrete choice approach to labor supply modeling has gained widespread popularity, mainly because it is much more practical than the traditional continuous approach based on marginal calculus (See Bloemen and Kapteyn, 2008) . However, from a theoretical perspective, the conventional discrete choice approach represents no essential departure from the traditional approach. This is because the only new assumptions made are that the set of feasible hours of work is finite and the random components of the utility function have particular distributional properties. 1 The purpose of this paper is to discuss identification and other aspects of an extended version of the conventional discrete choice model (latent job choice model) that allow for agents' preferences being dependent on non-pecuniary job attributes, as well as allowing for possible restrictions on hours of work opportunities. In the latent job choice model, originally proposed by Dagsvik (1994) , the starting point is the assumption that a worker's labor supply follows from his or her job choice. More precisely, labor supply is viewed as resulting from a choice among latent job "packages", each of which is characterized by an offered wage rate, offered hours of work and non-pecuniary (qualitative) attributes describing the nature of the job-specific tasks to be performed. This setup can be viewed as a version of Lancaster's characteristic approach -see Lancaster (1966 Lancaster ( , 1971 ) -where agents have preferences regarding not only consumption and leisure, but also job attributes. The characteristic approach is intuitively appealing because it shifts the focus to qualitative aspects of the labor market that everyday life experiences tell us are important. Examples of such latent job attributes of major importance are job-specific tasks to be performed, location, quality of the social and physical environment, etc. More recently, Farzin (2009) has discussed the effects of including non-pecuniary variables explicitly in the traditional labor supply model. He argues that ignoring such aspects of jobs can result in biased estimates and thus lead to 1 Van Soest (1995) and others have proposed to introduce suitable dummies in the discrete labor supply model specification to improve the fit. However, this practice implies a non-structural model unless one interprets these dummies as part of the preference representation. In this case it means that the agent has stronger preferences for working particular hours (such as part time and full time hours) relatively to other hours. 3 misleading policy proposals. Further related approaches are put forward by Sattinger (1993 Sattinger ( , 1995 and van Ophem et al. (1993) .
The latent job choice model allows us to address neglected aspects in traditional labor supply analysis: namely that workers face important restrictions on their job choice in the labor market (Dagsvik et al., 2014) . Versions of the job choice model have been introduced and applied before: see Aaberge, et al. (1995) , Aaberge, et al. (1999) , Strøm (2004, 2006) , Dagsvik and Jia (2006) , Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) , Di Tommaso et al.
(2009), and Dagsvik et al. (2014) . This paper contains a number of new
contributions. First, we analyze the identification problem in depth. The identification problem in this type of model differs from standard identification results of discrete choice models because the present model contains representations of both preferences and choice constraints. We also extend the identification analysis to the case where the distribution of offered wage rates depends on unobserved individual characteristics. The empirical literature on job choice models cited above differs greatly in this respect. Aaberge et al.(1995) and Aaberge et al. (1999) assume that there is no unobserved variation in wages across workers, so that any unobserved heterogeneity in wages is due to firm characteristics. In contrast, Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) , Dagsvik and Jia (2006) and assume that wage variation is due solely to person-specific characteristics. In this paper, we clarify the differences between these two approaches and compare their empirical performances using a sample of Norwegian married/cohabitating couples. Finally, based on the model estimates, we discuss properties of the respective models and the issue of policy simulations. In particular, we show how one can simulate the effect of changes in labor supply restrictions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the basic structure of the modeling framework. In Section 3 we consider identification issues. In Section 4 we first report results from an empirical application. Then, we discuss how to simulate the effect of a particular reform in the restriction on working hours.
The modeling framework

Let ( , , )
U C h z be the (ordinal) utility function of the household, where C denotes household consumption (disposable income), h is hours of work, z = 1, 2,.., indexes market opportunities (jobs) and z = -1,-2,…, indexes non-market opportunities. For a market opportunity z, associated hours of work and wage rate are assumed fixed and equal to (H(z),W(z)), where 4 H(z), z = 1,2, ..., takes value on a set D and W(z) is positive. When z is negative ( ) 0. H z = In addition to the economic budget constraint, there are restrictions on the set of available market opportunities faced by a specific worker. This is because there are job types for which the worker is not qualified and there may be variations in the set of job opportunities for which he or she is qualified. In addition, due to competition in the labor market, jobs for which a worker is qualified may not necessarily be available to him or her. However, the choice sets of market and non-market opportunities are unobserved by the researcher.
Assumption 1
The utility function has the structure
is a positive random taste-shifter, 0 0 C ≥ is a known constant that represents subsistence consumption and M is the maximum hours of work.
The random taste-shifters are supposed to capture the effect of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences over non-pecuniary attributes that affect preferences across agent and across alternatives. Whereas the functional form of the deterministic part of the utility, 
) ( | ). g h g w h
Assumption 2 asserts that the taste-shifters associated with the set of available opportunities are independently scattered on the positive part of the real line but in a nonhomogeneous way. The probability that there is a job z in the choice set with taste-shifter
is decreasing in , ε it means that the intensity is large for ε close to zero. In other words, there are many available jobs that are unattractive jobs but relatively few attractive jobs available.
For example, jobs and non-market opportunities may be located in another region or country.
The parameter θ is clearly a measure of job availability since a high value of θ means that there is a high probability that a job with a given level of ( ) z ε is available. Dagsvik (1994) has demonstrated that θ can be interpreted as the ratio of the number of available market opportunities of interest (to the agent) to the number of nonmarket opportunities of interest. Note also that whereas in Assumption 1 preferences of hours are defined on the continuous set [0, M] , the set of feasible hours of work, D, is a discrete subset of (0, M). The interpretation of 1 ( ) g h is as the probability that a job z with ( )
available to the agent. The interpretation of 2 ( | ) g w h w ∆ is as the probability (when w ∆ is small) that a job z with ( ) ( , ) W z w w w ∈ + ∆ is available to the agent, given that ( ) . ( ) ( | ) g h g w h the opportunity density. A motivation for this particular type of representation of the set of available opportunities is given by Dagsvik (1994) . He demonstrates that the intensities of the Poisson processes must have the form given in Assumption 2 in order for the 6 choice of job to satisfy the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property.
2 In general, the offered distribution of wage rates may depend on hours of work, similarly to Moffitt (1984) . Aaronson and French (2009) have given a theoretical argument that supports this possibility.
Let ( , | ) h w I ϕ denote the joint density of hours of work and wage rate of the chosen job, given non-labor income I, and similarly let (0,0 | ) I ϕ be the probability of not working. In the case with discrete conditional distribution of offered wage rates (or continuous distribution of offered hours of work) similar expressions as in (2.2a, b) follow. The only difference is that the integration is replaced by summation (or summation is replaced by integration). The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Dagsvik (1994) but for the reader's convenience a simplified version is given in Appendix A. This proof also covers the special case with degenerate distribution of offered wage rates.
For the sake of interpretation, let ( , ) B h w be the (random) set of points of the (market) 
η If in addition, we assume that , i.e. the offered wage rate does not depends on offered hours of work, and that ( )
whereas in the analogous expression for the probability of not working the random effect must be integrated out. A two sector model similar to (2.6) has been applied by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) to analyze labor supply and sectoral choice.
When we get a model where offered wage rates vary across different job offers (to a given agent). This model version was applied by Aaberge et al. (1995) and Aaberge et al. (1999) .
Identification
We now turn to a discussion on identification of the model. We start with the simpler case where the random effect in the wage rate equation is ruled out, i.e., the model is as presented in Theorem 1. From Theorem 1 it follows that for positive h, Essentially, the identification problem arises from the fact that observed labor supply behavior is a result of both preferences (utility function) and latent job choice constraints (opportunity measure) in our model. One important property of our setup is that non-labor income enters the utility specification in a particular manner, namely such that it can generate variation in consumption while keeping hours of work and the wage rate constant, and it enters the model only through consumption, not affecting the opportunity measure. The next theorem shows to what extent the model can be non-parametrically identified in this case.
Theorem 2
Assume that Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. Then ( , ) v C h can be expressed as The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A. Theorem 2 shows that even under the exclusion restriction that non-labor income does not affect the opportunity measure the model is non-parametrically unidentified. Dagsvik and Strøm (1997) show identification in an analogous model by assuming that preferences are separable in consumption and hours of work, and more importantly that fixed cost of working is observed. However, such information is rarely available.
Assumption 4
The offered wage rates and the offered hours of work are independently distributed.
Theorem 3
Assume that Assumptions 1 to 4 hold. Then the distribution of offered hours is identified and
The proof is given in Appendix A. When offered wage rates and hours of work are correlated, additional restrictions are needed to achieve identification. Note that for the purpose of simulating solely the effect of counterfactual changes in taxes and wage rates it is not necessary to identify ( ) h δ and 1 ( ) g h separately as long as 1 ( ) g h is kept fixed. The reason is that the effect of changes in taxed and wages only enters the model through C and the opportunity density of offered wage rates.
One way to obtain full identification is to make parametric functional form assumptions about both ( , ) v C h and 1
( ) ( | ). g h g w h θ
Below, we consider one particular parametric utility specification, namely the generalized Box-Cox function given by
See Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) , Dagsvik and Røine Hoff (2011) for a theoretical justification based on invariance principles. 6 See also the Errata in Dagsvik (2013 Assumption 5 is not particularly restrictive. In fact, most tax systems satisfy this condition.
Assumption 6
The function log ( , ) 
) ( | ). g h g w h
We shall next consider the more general setting where we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in offered wage rate, i.e. the model given by (2.3a,b). As shown below, it is necessary to introduce an exogenous variable X which influences only the opportunity density.
Assumption 7
The offered wage rates are generated by The formulation in (3.3) is a special case of (2.4) with ( ) 0,
The parameter a may depend on other individual characteristics than X. The motivation for the particular formulation of ( ) θ ⋅ in Assumption 7 is that η + + Xb a is supposed to represent the effect of observed and unobserved individual ability which may affect the opportunity measure. Here, ( ) z ξ and η may be discrete random variables and ( ) z ξ may also be degenerate. Although here it is sufficient for our identification results that X is a scalar it could be extended to a vector. In the following we need to extend our notation of
Assumption 8
The function
Theorem 5 (i) If Assumptions 1 to 4, 7 and 8 hold then ( , ) v C h is identified apart from a multiplicative term that may depend on h, ( ) θ ⋅ is identified up to a constant and the distribution of offered wage rates conditional on the random effect is identified. (ii) If Assumptions 1 to 4, and 6 to 8 hold then the model in (2.3a,b) or (2.5) is identified.
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix A. Theorem 5 extends the identification results of Theorems 3 and 4 to the case with a random effect in the offered wage rate 7 The assumption is analogous in the case where X is discrete, in which case the integral with respect to X is replaced by a sum.
14 distribution. It is worth noting that because of Assumption 4 the independence condition is still maintained in Theorem 5 in contrast to Theorem 4 where offered wage rate and hours of work are allowed to be correlated.
Theorems 2 to 5 hold also in the case where the distribution of offered wage rates is discrete or the distribution of offered hours of work is continuous. Furthermore, Theorem 5 holds when X is a discrete variable or when the distribution of offered wage rates across jobs is degenerate, that is, where each agent only faces one individual specific wage rate.
An empirical application
Model specification and estimation results.
In this section we report results from an empirical application based on micro data from the Norwegian Labor Survey 1997. Details about variable definitions and the data, and the specification of a joint labor supply model for married couples can be found in Appendices B
and C, respectively.
The systematic part of the utility function is assumed to be a generalized Box-Cox functional form, similarly to (3.2). Alternatively, we could have used a flexible polynomial specification similarly to van Soest et al. (2002) . Strøm (2004, 2006) found that the Box-Cox functional form is more or less as flexible as the polynomial specifications, and in contrast to the latter ones it is globally concave. For each spouse, we specify eight feasible annual hours of work alternatives, namely 0, 208, 624, 1,040, 1,456, 1,950, 2,340 and 2,600.
The logarithm of the job availability measures F θ and M θ are specified as linear functions of length of schooling. The opportunity probability mass functions of offered hours, 1 ( ), (1995) . An advantage with our framework is that it provides a theoretical rationale for introducing such dummies in contrast to the conventional discrete choice labor supply model.
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A central issue in our empirical illustration is how to specify the opportunity density of offered wage rates. A fairly general class of specifications accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across both jobs and agents, as well as allowing for correlation between offered hours of work and offered wage rates, is given in (2.4). It remains, however, to prove that the model is identified in this case. Even in the case where offered hours and wage rates are independent it is a demanding task to obtain structural estimates due to measurement error in reported hours worked. In our data set, only weekly hours of work are reported but not the usual number of weeks worked during a year. Furthermore, overtime is not reported. This type of measurement error is common in data sets used for labor supply analysis. See for example Borjas (1980) and Blundell et al. (2007) for extensive discussions on how to deal with this problem in conventional labor supply models. This measurement error creates a spurious negative correlation between the observed wage rate and hours in our data (-0.22 for married women, -0.17 for married men). 8 This so-called "division bias" problem poses considerable challenges for empirical analyses based on this type of data.
When offered wage rates and offered hours of work are independent, the division bias problem can be reduced by adopting the three-stage estimation procedure proposed by Strøm (2004, 2006) . This amounts to estimating a reduced-form participation probability in the first stage, and subsequently estimate wage rate equations using the results from the first stage to control for selectivity bias. In the third stage the labor supply model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method after inserting the wage rates predicted by the estimated wage equations into the model and integrating out the respective error terms. Under standard assumptions about the measurement error this leads to unbiased wage rate equations in the second stage apart from the estimate of the variance of the error terms which may be upward biased. This procedure does of course not eliminate the measurement error in hours of work but it removes the spurious negative correlation between observed hours and wage rates.
Measurement error may still be a problem in the last stage maximum likelihood estimation, since it may cause misclassification of the dependent variable (individual's working hours). Hausman et al. (1998) suggest a method to control for the misspecification problem in binary choice model. However, their method is not readily applicable in our analysis. Monte Carlo evidence reported in Flood and Islam (2005) indicates that the measurement error is only a serious problem in discrete choice labor supply model when it is large.
Given Assumption 4, we have estimated two special cases of the model in (2.3a, b):
Model 1 and Model 2. Using the notation of (2.5), Model 1 is based on the assumption that all observable identical individuals are assumed to face the same offered wage rate distribution across jobs ( ( ) 0 η ψ = ⋅ = ) whereas in Model 2 each individual faces only one offered wage, though this wage may be different for observationally identical individuals ( ( )
Thus, the interpretation of the first stage wage rate equations is rather different in the two model versions, although the estimated equations are the same. In model 1, the error terms in the wage rate equations measure the variation of wage rates offers across different jobs. In contrast, in Model 2, the error terms represent unobserved individual heterogeneity.
9
The specification of the wage rate equations is conventional. In Model 1 ( ) z ξ is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and in Model 2 η is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. Thus, the estimated residual variances in the wage rate equations are interpreted as the variance of ( ) z ξ and η in Models 1 and 2, respectively. The termα is specified as a linear function of length of schooling, potential experience, potential experience squared and a dummy variable for marriage status. Potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus 7. The estimates of the wage rate equations are presented in Table C .1 in Appendix C. As shown in Table C .1, the selection bias in the wage rate equations is negligible.
The estimates of the two models are reported in Table C .2 in Appendix C. In both models the results imply that log ( , ) v C h is strictly increasing and concave in consumption and leisure. The marginal utilities of female and male leisure are increasing functions of age.
The number of children has a significant effect on the marginal utility of leisure for married women. In contrast, the marginal utility of leisure for married men does not depend significantly on the number of children. This indicates that the female takes more responsibility for children within the family than the male, which is not a surprising result.
The measure of the job availability for the married women, , F θ depends positively on the length of schooling (S). Higher educational level increases the job opportunities for married women. The corresponding estimate for married men turns out not to be significant. This may be due to the fact that in our data set there are only very few married men who are out of the 9 One should, in principle, interpret the estimated error terms in the Mincer type wage equations as the sum of inter-and intra-individual effects, ( ) . z ξ η + Although it seems technically possible to separate the contribution of these two terms, we believe that this identification hinges too much on the mathematical structure of the model and is therefore not theoretically sound, given the available information. labor force. For both genders, the value of θ is estimated to be less than 1. Similar results are reported by Strøm (2006), Di Tommaso et al. (2009) and .
As discussed earlier, this can be interpreted as indicating that the number of interesting and available jobs is smaller than the number of interesting non-market opportunities. Note also that the full-time and part-time peaks in the opportunity probability mass function of hours for married men are substantially higher than the corresponding peaks for married women. The reason for this is that women seem to have stronger preferences than men for working in particular labor market sectors (such as health care and teaching) and therefore may face different choice restrictions. This could partly be due to differences in gender-specific human capital investments, which are important in shaping the job choice constraints. 
Aggregate wage elasticities and "labor supply curves"
In this section, we present selected gross wage elasticities and figures for what we call labor supply curves. We have calculated elasticities that take into account both the systematic terms and the unobservables in the model. This means that we account for how the mean of the distribution of labor supply is affected by changes in (say) gross wage levels.
There are two types of elasticities reported in the literature: see, for example, Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and van Soest and Das (2001) . One type is the so-called average elasticity, which is simply the average of the individual elasticities calculated from the formulas for expected hours of work or probability of working given the individual observed characteristics. The second is called aggregated elasticity, which is the elasticity of the aggregate (or average) response (e.g. the elasticity of the population mean hours of work). Table 1 displays aggregated gross wage elasticities for both models. The standard errors are generated using bootstrap methods with 100 replications. We have also computed the average elasticities for both models: the estimates are quite close to the aggregated elasticities reported in Table 1 . The unconditional wage elasticity of hours of work is defined as the elasticity of expected number of hours of work with respect to wage. The corresponding elasticity of hours of work conditional on working can be found by subtracting the wage elasticity of the probability of working from the unconditional wage elasticity of hours of work.
In general, both models show that the gross wage elasticities are moderate for married females and very small for married males. Model 2 seems to predict stronger labor supply response than Model 1, though the differences are not big. Using estimates from Model 2, for married females the own-wage elasticity of the probability of working is equal to 0.33, which means that if the gross wages of married females were to increase by 5 percent (say), then the aggregate proportion of married females working would increase by around 1.5 percent. The cross wage elasticity for married women is negative and smaller in size than own wage elasticity, as found in many studies. The elasticity of the probability of working for married women with respect to both spouse's gross wage rate is equal to 0.2. This means that the proportion of married women working would increase by 1 percent, if both spouses' wage rates were increased by 5 percent.
Since the model is highly non-linear, the aggregate elasticities may cover substantial variation in elasticities across different wage levels and individual characteristics. Remember that when we have estimated the model we can compute wage elasticities conditional on 21 given hypothetical wage levels, without using wage equations. To illustrate the non-linearity in the labor supply response resulting from wage changes we have plotted what we call women in both models vary with her expected gross wage level. Both models predict that labor supply elasticities decreases as married women's wage increases. However, at low wage rate levels the labor supply curves are steeper for Model 2 than for Model 1, whereas the difference is small between the two models at high wage rate levels.
Simulation of changes in the opportunity distribution of offered hours of work
Using our framework, we can also simulate the effect on labor supply from changing the opportunity distribution. Since our model is not an equilibrium one we can only simulate pure supply effects conditional on given the job availability measures, ( , ), However, one needs to be careful when interpreting this result in the context of reforms specific to labor market sectors (such as the health care sector), since sector-specific preferences and restrictions are not explicitly accounted for in the model. Nevertheless, this simulation exercise clearly illustrates the advantage and potential of our modeling framework.
Conclusion
The traditional models of labor supply, being versions of the theory of consumer demand with two goods, disposable income and leisure, simplify the choice setting in labor markets. In real labor markets, agents have preferences over pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary aspects of jobs and face limited sets of job opportunities in the labor market due to competition between workers and restrictions resulting from institutional regulations on hours of work.
An essential feature of the modeling framework discussed in this paper is that it allows the researcher to accommodate restrictions on hours of work and the set of feasible jobs typically observed in many data sets. A major contribution of this paper is the analysis of identification. The standard identification results for multinomial and mixed logit models do not apply because our modeling framework contains representation of both preferences and 24 latent choice constraints (opportunity measure). Although the model is in general not identified we have demonstrated how it will be identified under specific conditions even in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in offered wage rate distribution.
We have carried out an empirical application based on micro data from Norway. In contrast to Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) , where they estimated a similar model for married women given the husband's labor supply, we study the joint labor supply behavior for married couples simultaneously. We have, moreover, estimated two versions of the model based on two "extreme" assumptions about wage heterogeneity. A model with solely interindividual variation in wage rates seems to fit the data better than a model that allows only for variation in wage rates across jobs. We have computed labor supply curves to illustrate the substantial non-linearity in the labor supply responses, as function of wage rates and to illustrate how these curves depend on the two model formulations. Subsequently, we have shown how one can use the model to simulate the effect of hypothetical changes in the opportunity measure. Changes of this sort cannot be studied using conventional discrete labor supply models.
The data we have applied are not ideal due to measurement error in the hours of work observations. We are currently working on establishing another data set with much less measurement error in hours which hopefully will be helpful for studying the relationship between the offered wage rates and offered hours within a labor supply modeling framework.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1:
From Assumptions 1 and 2 and Proposition 3.8 in Resnick (1987, p. 135) Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3:
By assumption 4, 2 2 ( | ) ( ). g w h g w = From (2.2a) and (A.11) it then follows that for 0, The right hand side of (A.13) is known, since r(I) is identified by (A.12). By integrating (A.13) with respect to I we realize that log ( (0, ),0) v f I is determined for each positive I up to an additive constant. But this means that ( ,0) v C is identified up to a multiplicative constant.
f hw I h g h f hw I I f hw I h I h g h h w I h w I v f h w I h g h f h w I I f h w I h I h g h
In the case where the distribution of offered wage rates is not degenerate we get from Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Since by assumption 5, 2 ( , ) 
For the case 0 β = , the term ( )
otherwise. Q.E.D.
Before we embark on the proof of Theorem 5 we need the following result.
Lemma 1:
Assume that Assumption 3 holds and let the function ( , ) C I κ be determined by ( ( , ) It is easy to see that when we vary C within a small neighborhood the choice of ( , ) C h * * can be kept fixed.
In the case where
and similarly to the case above we can find C C * < such that
Since C C * < , we have
Since the two latter inequalities are similar to (A.26) and (A.27) it follows that (A.25) has a positive solution also in this case. This concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Case (i):
Consider first the case where ( ) z ξ is distributed according to a continuous distribution with density (.) . g ξ Under Assumption 7, we get from (2.3a) that Information on education is obtained from the National Education database, a register database that can be linked to the Labor force survey using the system with personal identification numbers.
Whereas the Labor force survey yields detailed information about employment and hours of work, it does not provide information about annual labor incomes that can be used in the calculations of (average) gross wage rates, and non-labor income. To obtain this information we apply the Tax Return Register (includes more detailed information about employee income, self-employment income, taxable pensions etc.) These data can be linked to the Labor force survey using personal identification numbers. Nominal hourly wage rates are measured as labor income, measures as the sum of labor income from the main and the second job (if the individual has a second job) divided by (formal) total annual hours of work (for main -and second job). Households where one of the adults has hours of work higher than 80, or wage rate less than NOK 50 or higher than NOK 400 are excluded. Experience (potential experience) is defined as age minus years of schooling minus 7.
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The sample we use only includes persons with age between 26-62 years. The motivation for this is that for women below 26 years of age education is an important activity and for those more than 62 years of age early retirement is rather frequent. The number of children includes all children with age less than 19. In Table B .1 we report the summary statistics for the sample used in estimating the labor supply model.
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Appendix C.
Model for Married Couples
The modeling framework for two-person households is completely similar to the case for single individual households. Let ( ) 
.
h w h w I ϕ be the joint density of hours of work and wage rate for female and male in the household, given household non-labor income I. Then, model (2.2a, b) can be generalized to 
f w h w h I h h g h g w h g h g w h
Empirical model specification:
The job availability indexes θ k ,k=M, F, are assumed to depend on the wages solely through the amount of schooling. Specifically, we assume that * N is the size of the household. ** To avoid potential multi-colinearity, we have used the deviation from the mean of log(age/10).
Appendix D Simulation of changes in the opportunity distribution of offered hours of work
Recall that in our framework, 1 ( ) After the part-time peak has been removed, the offered hours are uniformly distributed apart from a peak at the full-time interval. Since there are five intervals for which the new opportunity density is constant we must have that 
